The Tax Status of Agreements to Pay Alimony by Galloway, Jean A.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 9 Issue 2 Article 7 
Winter 1957 
The Tax Status of Agreements to Pay Alimony 
Jean A. Galloway 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Galloway, Jean A. (1957) "The Tax Status of Agreements to Pay Alimony," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 
9 : Iss. 2 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol9/iss2/7 
This Note is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
SECRECY AND THE GRAND JURY IN SOUTH CAROLINA
ScoPr
The requirement of secrecy in grand jury proceedings has prob-
ably given the laymen who compose these bodies more difficulty
than any other phase of their work. The grand jury as a vital part
of the legal process has been defended by the late L. D. Lide, judge
of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit.' It also has been upheld by another
prominent circuit judge, G. Duncan Bellinger of the Fifth Circuit,
but Judge Bellinger added that the jury is "hampered by existing
procedure."
2
The questions most frequently raised, which will be discussed
here, are: (1) persons permitted to be present in the grand jury
room; (2) the effect of transcribing testimony; (3) the effect of
the presence of unauthorized persons; (4) indicting for perjury the
person who swears to one set of facts in the grand jury room and
another in open court, and (5) what and how the grand jury can
reveal what it has heard.
As the title indicates, this study is concerned primarily with South
Carolina law, although reference will be made to the rules in other
jurisdictions. The writer is informed that legislation has been pre-
pared for submission to the General Assembly in 1955 which would
make South Carolina law, in many respects, conform to the federal
rules, and for this reason a separate section has been included on
the applicable federal law.
GENERAL CONsmERATIONS
Recently, the Richland County grand jury, in the course of two
separate investigations, has appealed for legislation to permit it to
have legal counsel and a stenographer. 3 The members pointed out
that they are unskilled in the interrogation of witnesses, and that
in a lengthy investigation they have no way to refer to testimony
of previous witnesses to check for inconsistencies or obtain leads for
questions.
In one investigation, in an honest attempt to perform their duties
as best they could, the members of the Richland County grand jury
1. LIDE, THE TRIAL JUDGE IN SOUTH CAROLINA 12 (1953).
2. THE STATE (Columbia, S. C.), May 29, 1953, p. 1, col. 6.
3. THE STATE (Columbia, S. C.), Oct. 25, 1954, p. 1, col. 5; Id., May 29,
1953, p. 1, col. 8.
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may have exceeded their authority, by revealing to members of
Columbia City Council information about city affairs obtained from
other witnesses.4 No authority can be found for this act, even
though Council members were taken into the jury room one at a
time and sworn to secrecy. And yet, the jurors felt they had learned
of a situation about which Council should know, and that Council
was the proper agency to deal with the matter. Under such circum-
stances, what can a grand jury do?
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
In common with several other states and the federal courts, South
Carolina has no statutory form of oath for grand jurors, and no
provision for secrecy in their proceedings.
The grand jury in this state is authorized by the Constitution of
1895, 5 which merely continued the existing law providing for a jury
of 18 qualified electors, 12 of whom must concur in the jury's find-
ings. Statutory provisions are meager, and none of them mention
secrecy.
6
Clerks of Court administer the common law form of oath as fol-
lows:
You, as foreman of this Grand Inquest, shall diligently in-
quire and true presentment make of all such matters and things
as shall be given you in charge; the State's counsel, your
fellows' and your own, you shall well and truly keep secret.
You shall present no one for envy, hatred or malice; nor shall
you leave any one unpresented for fear, favor, affection, re-
ward, or hope of reward; but you shall present all things truly
as they come to your knowledge, according to the best of your
understanding. So help you God.7
After this oath is taken by the foreman, the other jurors take a
short oath to the effect that the oath which the foreman has taken
on his part, each of them shall well and truly observe.
This is substantially the same oath administered to the grand
jury in the 17th century,8 although a somewhat similar oath appears
to have been used as far back as the reign of Ethelred II (A.D.
4. Id., Oct. 29, 1954, p. 1, col. 1.
5. Article 5, § 22.
6. CODE OF LAWS oF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 38-401 to § 38-410.
7. MILLER'S COMPILATION OF RULES or COURT 159 (Charleston, 1848);
EARL'S FORm BOOK 336 (Walhalla, 1911).
8. BOOK OF OATHS 206 (London, 1649).
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978-1016).9 However, secrecy was not a requisite, or even a right,
of the grand jury until late in the 17th century when the famous
Lord Shaftesbury's case 10 was tried, and the grand jury insisted on
hearing witnesses in private, after which it refused to indict the earl
for high treason.
SOUTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
Surprisingly few cases have arisen in South Carolina on the in-
vasion of the secrecy of the grand jury, possibly because the doc-
trine of Lord Shaftesbury's case, supra, has been so firmly imbedded
in the legal minds of this state.
The leading case in this jurisdiction is State v. Rector," in which
the Supreme Court held that the trial judge could take no steps to-
ward obtaining information as to the number of jurors concurring
in an indictment, and whether the necessary number included an
unqualified member.
Leaving no doubt about the standing of secrecy in this state, the
court said:
As long as the grand jury has been known to our judicial
system, and that body came with the organization of our first
Courts, their acts and proceedings have been regarded almost
sacredly secret.
It is plain that the general rule observed in all jurisdictions
to which there is no exception, except where made by proper
legislation, forbids any inquiry into the proceedings of the grand
jury.
The court suggested that a juror who violated his oath might be
liable to criminal charges as an accessory after the fact.
But this doctrine had been staunchly announced as far back as
1833, when the court held that it was a violation of a juror's duty
to give an affidavit as to the form in which the grand jury received
certain evidence, saying that "the nature of a juror's oath sufficiently
indicates they are not to communicate to others that which passes
among the jury in their consultation."1
In State v. Addison,13 the court quashed an indictment where
private counsel employed to aid the prosecution entered the grand
9. WILKiN's LnGos ANGLIAE SAXONICA 117 (1721).
10. 8 How. St. Tr. 774 (1681).
11. 158 S.C. 212, 155 S.E. 385 (1930).
12. State v. Boyd, 2 Hill 288 (S.C. 1833).
13. 2 S.C. 356 (1870).
19551
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jury room while the jurors were deliberating to advise them of their
duty. Nine years later, however, an exception was made when the
court refused to quash an indictment where the jury called the so-
licitor in to ask his advice on the form of the presentment, after it
had agreed. 14 In that case, Mr. Justice Haskell said that the solici-
tor "is a sworn officer of the state, and responsible for the proper
discharge of the duties of his office; he is presumed to have the
power to discriminate between matters on which he should or should
not communicate with the grand jury, and error must be shown and,
not presumed."
In that case, the court distinguished State v. Addison, supra, not-
ing that here the grand jury had completed its deliberations. By
way of dicta, the court added that it was the "right and duty" of
the solicitor to communicate with the grand jury at any time as to
the manner in which its business is to be conducted.
The leading case on the powers and duties of the grand jury is
State v. Branlett,15 which is practically a text book on the subject.
In that case, the court held that the grand jury has no right, inter alia,
to discuss evidence heard ex parte; and the jurors also have no au-
thority to present any person by name with words of censure with-
out also presenting him for indictment or finding a true bill against
him.
FZDERAL RumEs
The applicable federal statutory provisions are found in the Rules
of Criminal Procedure 16 and provide that attorneys for the govern-
ment, witnesses under examination, interpreters when needed, and
stenographers may be present in the grand jury room during the
taking of testimony, but that no one may be present when the jury
is deliberating or voting.17 The district courts may administer oaths
of secrecy in their discretion, but there is no statutory form or re-
quirement that an oath be given.18
But as far back as 1881 and uniformly since, federal courts have
held that the grand jury may be released from its oath of secrecy
in a proper case where justice requires this step.19 In United States
14. State v. McNinch, 12 S.C. 89 (1879).
15. 166 S.C. 323, 164 S.E. 873 (1932).
16. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771.
17. Id., Rule 6(d).
18. Id., Rule 6(e); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283 (E.D.
Pa., 1933); Goodman v. United States, 108 F. 2d 516, 127 A.L.R. 265 (9th
Cir. 1939); United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S. Ct-
811, 84 L.Ed. 1129 (1940).
19. United States v. Farrington, 5 Fed. 343 (1881).
[Vol. 7
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v. American Medical Association,20 the court held that the jury is
not released from its oath by operation of indictment, arrest of the
accused or the expiration of the jury term, but may only be released
from its oath by the court when justice requires. This decision ap-
pears to modify and restrict earlier decisions to the effect that secrecy
may be withdrawn after the indictment is published and the defendant
apprehended.
2 1
The federal courts have held that grand jurors may be required
to testify as to evidence given before the grand jury.22
Federal courts have taken a middle-of-the-road policy as to how
strictly the secrecy requirement should be construed. They have held
that the presence of one witness while another witness was testify-
ing was a substantial deprivation of the defendant's rights and suffici-
ent to set aside an indictment.28 But where testimony was taken in
the grand jury room by a duly appointed stenographer and then
transcribed by public stenographers, the court held this was not
enough, without a showing of prejudice, to invalidate the indictment
on the grounds that the secrecy of the grand jury had been violated.2
But the presence of an unauthorized stenographer is sufficient to viti-
ate the indictment.2 5
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Many jurisdictions have adopted statutory forms of oaths for grand
juries, inserting after the words "keep secret," some such phrase as
"unless called upon to give evidence thereof in some court of law in
this state,"26 or "unless called on in a court of justice to make dis-
closures. ' "2 7  Still others abandon altogether the requirement for
secrecy in the oath, although still adhering to the common law
principles. 2
8
In making the sweeping statement in State v. Rector, supra, that
no jurisdiction would inquire into grand jury proceedings in the
absence of legislation, the South Carolina court appears to have over-
looked completely an old case in the sister state of North Carolina.
20. 26 F. Supp. 429 (D.D.C. 1939).
21. Metzler v. United States, 64 F. 2d 203 (9th Cir. 1933) ; Atvell v. United
States, 162 Fed. 97, 89 C.C.A. 97, 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1049, 15 Ann. Cas. 253
(1908).
22. United States v. Porter, Fed. Cas. No. 16,072, 2 Cranch, C.C. 60, 2 D.C.
60 (1812).
23. United States v. Edgerton, 80 Fed. 374 (1897).
24. United States v. Amazon Industrial Chemical Corp., 55 F. 2d 254 (1932).
25. Latham v. United States, 226 Fed. 420 (5th Cir. 1915).
26. GEORGIA CoDe AN. § 59-203 (1939).
27. WYOMING RVISEn STAruTIs ANN. § 61-107 (1931).
28. CODE OF VIRGINIA 1950 § 19-127.
1955]
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In that jurisdiction in 1846, the court said in a shocked tone that it
would be a monstrous miscarriage of justice for a Court of Law to
give its blessings to perjury by preventing a grand juror from testi-
fying against a witness who swore to one set of facts before the
grand jury and another in open court, and held that the grand juror
could be required to testify as to evidence heard in secret.2 9 That
the juror could not testify against the person who committed per-
jury before the grand jury was the early English view, but was
thrown out in its first test.3 0 A number of American and English
cases have since held that a witness may be indicted for perjury on
the testimony of grand jurors.3 1
At the same time, North Carolina has upheld the secrecy of the
grand jury. In State v. Branch, 2 a case remarkably like Lord
Shaftesbury's case, the trial judge required the grand jury to come
into open court and hear testimony publicly. The indictment was
promptly quashed by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
While it appears to be universally held that the presence of an un-
authorized person during the deliberations of the jury will be grounds
for abatement,3 3 there is a split of authority as to whether the
presence at other times is sufficient to quash, the majority taking the
view that it is not unless prejudice is shown or is probable.3 4 The
minority holds that the participation of any unauthorized person at
any stage of the proceedings is grounds for abatement without a
showing of prejudice.3 5
But at the same time, most jurisdictions hold that it is the duty
of the state's attorney to examine witnesses for the jury when re-
quested,36 even in the absence of a statutory provision. But none
of these will extend the right to a private prosecutor even though
29. State v. Broughton, 29 N.C. 96, 45 Am. Dec. 507 (1846).
30. 4 Bl. Com. 126, Christian's note (1800).
31. United States v. Charles, Fed. Cas. No. 14,786, 2 Cranch C. C. 76 (D.C.
Cir. 1813); Rex v. Hughes, 1 Car. & K. 519 (1844); People v. Young, 31
Cal. 563 (1867); State v. Fassett, 16 Conn. 457 (1844); State v. Offutt, 4
Blackf. 355 (Ind. 1837); Commonwealth v. Hill, 11 Cush. 137 (Mass. 1853);
Huidekoper v. Cotton, 3 Watts 56 (Pa. 1834); State v. Terry, 30 Mo. 368
(1860); Crocker v. State, Meigs 127 (Tenn. 1838) ; Thomas v. Commonwealth,
2 Robinson 795 (Va. 1843); 1 Chitty Cr. Law § 322 (1816).
32. 68 N.C. 186, 12 Am. Rep. 633 (1873).
33. State v. Wetzel, 75 W.Va. 7, 83 S.E. 68, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1074 (1914).
34. Sadler v. State, 124 Tenn. 50, 136 S.W. 430, Ann. as. 1912D, 976 (1911) ;
L.R.A. 1916D, 1123. In People v. Ramirez, 56 Cal. 533, 38 Am. Rep. 73 (1880),
the court held that an interpreter who was also a prosecuting witness being
present was not grounds for abatement.
35. See note 25 supra, as to clerk's presence; Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 166
A. 45 (1933) (attorney for plaintiff suing defendant).
36. Gitchell v. People, 146 11. 175, 33 N.E. 757 (1893) ; State v. Coulter, 104
Miss. 764, 61 So. 706 (1913) ; State v. Wetzel, supra, note 33.
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appointed to assist the state,3 7 nor even to the assistant solicitor,3 8
and most certainly not to a private prosecutor not duly appointed.39
Some jurisdictions have refused to quash indictments where the
jury had a stenographer present even though none was authorized.
4 °
Where the jurisdiction allows state's attorneys or clerks to be pre-
sent, the provision of secrecy also includes them.
41
The juror, or other authorized person covered by the provision,
may be liable, as the South Carolina court suggested, to criminal
charges as an accessory after the fact for violating the jury's se-
crecy, 42 or he may be held in contempt.
43
CONCLUSION
The reasons for surrounding the proceedings of the grand jury
with secrecy have led to diverse theories, 44 but the chief reasons ad-
vanced today are that it encourages witnesses to testify fully without
fear of reprisal, or that it protects the jury itself from undue influ-
ence in making its decisions. Undoubtedly, both of these considera-
tions contain some merit. But carried to extremes, the secrecy
provision brings with it about as many evils as it cures.
In adhering to the "almost sacredly secret" doctrine announced
in State v. Rector, supra, South Carolina has closed the door on the
possibility of a stenographer for the grand jury, which the juries
themselves say is a crying need. This jurisdiction will allow the
solicitor to enter the room to instruct the jurors on the law, but
even under the McNinch case it is extremely doubtful that the court
would go so far as to permit the questioning of witnesses for the
jury by the prosecuting attorney. While most jurisdictions hold
that prejudice must be shown where others are in the jury room
unless the jury is actually deliberating or voting, under State v. Boyd
in this state it would appear that the presence of others at any stage
of the proceedings is grounds for abatement, the taking of testimony
being considered as a part of the jury's "consultation."
37. Coblentz v. State, supra, note 35; Wilson v. State, 70 Miss. 595, 13 So.
225 (1893) ; Hartgraves v. State, 5 Okla. Crim. Rep. 226, 114 P. 343 (1911).
38. See note 35 supra.
39. Collier v. State, 104 Miss. 602, 61 So. 689 (1913).
40. Richards v. State, 108 Ark. 87, 157 S.W. 141 (1913) ; State v. Bowman,
90 Me. 363, 38 At. 331 (1897); State v. Brewster, 70 Vt. 341, 40 Atl. 1037
(1898).
41. 1 GRENLEAF ON EviDNcE § 252 (16th ed. 1899).
42. State v. Rector, supra, note 11; Sands v. Robison, 12 Smedes and M.
704, 51 Am. Dec. 132 (Miss. 1849).
43. 17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1049.
44. Huidekoper v. Cotton, note 31 supra; Crocker v. State, note 31; 4 Bl.
Com. 126, Christian's Note (1800); EDWARDS, THn GRAND JURY 116 (1906).
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Probably the worst result of the Boyd decision is that one referred
to by the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Broughton,
the protection of those who swear falsely before the grand jury.
Under the decisions in this state there appears to be no way to pre-
vent this.
As to the action of the Richland County grand jury in informing
Columbia City Council of what it had heard, State v. Branlett would
appear to prohibit this, as would the Boyd case. The Bramlett case
held that the jury has no right to "discuss" evidence heard ex parte,
and the Boyd case that it may not "communicate to others" what it
has heard. Apparently the only way the grand jury could have
communicated this matter to anyone would be to present someone
for indictment, or return a true bill against someone.
The federal rule seems to be a salutary one, and South Carolina
could well consider legislation adopting some of its provisions. If,
as the McNinch case said, the solicitor is a sworn officer of the
state presumed to be performing his duties in a proper manner, why
should he not be permitted to be present during the questioning of
difficult witnesses when requested? There also appears to be no,
harm in having a stenographer to transcribe lengthy testimony, es-
pecially since the cloak of secrecy in such case would extend to both
the solicitor and stenographer.
Provision might also be made for a trained investigator for the
grand jury, or in the alternative, to grant the jury the right to
communicate to the proper agency what it thinks should be investi-
gated and why. It is obvious that many things will come to the
attention of the grand jury from time to time which it is not equipped
to investigate fully, and in which it lacks sufficient information to
present anyone by name.
To prevent the possibility of perjured testimony in the grand jury
room with immunity for the guilty person, the federal rule appears
sound-leave it to the discretion of the trial court to release the
jurors from their pledge of secrecy in a proper case, when justice
requires.
J. R:Esn DANIEL.
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